Genes, genomes, and codes : revisiting some key terms with multiple meanings by Fox Keller, Evelyn
		 MÈTODE	 135
GENES, GENOMES, AND CODES
REVISITING SOME KEY TERMS WITH MULTIPLE MEANINGS
eveLyn Fox KeLLer
Is a genome the full complement of an organism’s genes or of its DNA? Is genetics the study of genes 
or of heredity? Is the genetic code the mechanism for translating nucleotide sequence to amino acid 
sequence or to phenotype? Does «genetic information» refer to the sequences coding for proteins or 
to all DNA sequences? Each of these questions stems from an elision between one, concrete, meaning, 
and another, open-ended and ambiguous. Such elision invites the illusion that the ambiguity of the 
open-ended term has been resolved, and by implication, that the gap between actual achievement 
and promise has been closed. Yet, despite the phenomenal progress molecular biology has made, we 
remain without an adequate account of the organization of proteins into an organism. 
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In a recent commentary celebrating the current 
state of (or, as he emphasizes, current gaps in) our 
understanding of DNA, Philip Ball, a former editor of 
Nature, wrote: 
This week’s diamond jubilee of the discovery of DNA’s 
molecular structure rightly celebrates how Francis 
Crick, James Watson and their collaborators launched 
the «genomic age» by revealing 
how hereditary information is 
encoded in the double helix. Yet 
the conventional narrative [...] 
is as misleading as the popular 
narrative of gene function itself 
in which the DNA sequence 
is translated into proteins and 
ultimately into an organism’s 
observable characteristics, or 
phenotype.
(Ball, 2013, p. 419)
A bit later, he added:
A student referring to textbook 
discussions of genetics and evolution could be forgiven 
for thinking that the «central dogma» devised by Crick 
and others in the 1960s – in which information flows 
in a linear, traceable fashion from DNA sequence 
to messenger RNA to protein, to manifest finally 
as phenotype – remains the solid foundation of the 
genomic revolution. In fact, it is beginning to look more 
like a casualty of it. 
(Ball, 2013, p. 419)
In other words, we celebrate the Watson-Crick 
revelation of «how hereditary information is encoded 
in the double helix» while at the same time admitting 
the utterly misleading nature of the «conventional 
narrative» of their discovery – a narrative «as 
misleading as the popular narrative of gene function 
itself».
But what exactly is it that is 
so misleading? Ball actually 
gives us two narratives – one he 
refers to as the conventional, the 
other as the popular narrative; 
one is a claim about hereditary 
information, the other a claim 
about the genetic code. These are 
not the same. Then how is it that 
such «misleading» narratives are 
so routinely perpetuated in the 
teaching of molecular biology?
Part of the answer to this 
question is to be found in the 
replication of this ambiguity throughout the discourse 
of molecular biology (preceded by a parallel set of 
ambiguities in the discourse of classical genetics) that 
has worked for sixty years to simultaneously sustain 
and obscure what Ball now sees as misleading. I 
begin with the two narratives that Ball invokes: a) 
DNA sequence codes for proteins which ultimately 
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phenotype. In popular lingo, DNA makes RNA, RNA 
makes proteins, and proteins make us; b) hereditary 
information is encoded in the double helix.
The concept of code figures crucially in both. In 
the first, the meaning of code (or encode) is quite 
clear. It derives from telegraphy and cryptography and 
is in fact the first definition given by the dictionary: to 
encode is «to translate into cipher or code; to express 
information by means of a code. Colloquially, “to 
code”» (Oxford English Dictionary, n. d.). As in the 
Morse code. Indeed, Crick was explicit about this 
being the sense in which he used the term code in his 
sequence hypothesis. «Genetic code» referred to the 
process of translation from a text written in nucleotide 
sequences to one written in amino acid sequences. 
Incidentally, he was also careful to distinguish the 
sequence hypothesis from what he called the central 
dogma: the hypothesis that «Once information has got 
into a protein it can’t get out again»1.
The deciphering of the genetic code was a 
tremendous achievement in the history of biology 
and it well deserves to be celebrated. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, so too was the central dogma, at least 
as Crick understood it. Moreover, there is nothing to 
suggest anything misleading in either claim. What is 
it then that has the reader led astray? 
The difficulty to which Philip Ball refers arises 
when people speak of the hereditary information 
encoded in the double helix, for, in this formulation, 
another quite different sense of encode is commonly 
invoked, namely the information required not for 
a set of proteins, but for an organism. More in the 
sense of Schrödinger’s code-script, a notion that 
preceded Crick’s concept of code by fifteen years; 
i.e., in the sense, as Schrödinger (1944) himself 
wrote, that: 
Every complete set of chromosomes contains the full 
code; so there are, as a rule, two copies of the latter in 
the fertilized egg cell, which forms the earliest stage 
of the future individual. In calling the structure of the 
chromosome fibres a code-script we mean that the 
all-penetrating mind, once conceived by Laplace, to 
which every causal connection lay immediately open, 
could tell from their structure whether the egg would 
develop, under suitable conditions, into a black cock 
or into a speckled hen, into a fly or a maize plant, a 
rhododendron, a beetle, a mouse or a woman. 
(Schrödinger, 1944, p. 21)
1  Ideas on protein synthesis (1956), collected in the Francis Compton 
Crick Paper at the archive of the Wellcome Library for the History and 
















But, as he also acknowledged:
[…] the term code-script is, of course, too narrow. The 
chromosome structures are at the same time instrumental 
in bringing about the development they foreshadow. They 
are law-code and executive power – or, to use another 
simile, they are architect’s plan and builder’s craft – in 
one. 
(Schrödinger, 1944, p. 22)
In other words, unlike that of the Morse code, 
Schrödinger could not say what a code-script is. 
Its meaning, perforce, had to remain open-ended, 
characterized not by what it is but by what it is 
expected to do, by the answer it is hoped to provide. 
The question that arises is this: are these two different 
narratives, one referring to hereditary information 
and the other to sequence information, one to the 
hereditary code-script and other 
to the genetic code, or are they 
two different versions of the same 
narrative, linked by a common 
vocabulary? I suggest that we 
have here two distinct narratives, 
both of which have played crucial 
roles in molecular biology, and 
that what Ball characterizes as 
misleading is the collapse of these 
two narratives into one. 
But this duality is not limited 
to the meanings of code. Indeed, it recurs in virtually 
all the new terms imported into biology with the 
molecular revolution. Not surprisingly, the same 
elisions also recur in the links commonly assumed 
between genes, information, codes and code-script. 
Take, for example, Ball’s own reference to Crick’s 
«central dogma» as the thesis that «information flows 
in a linear, traceable fashion from DNA sequence 
to messenger RNA to protein, to manifest finally as 
phenotype», conflating Crick’s own version of the 
central dogma as the thesis that «Once information 
has got into a protein it can’t get out again». The 
difference, namely the link between a list of proteins 
and an organism’s phenotype, is crucial, and the locus 
of much of the most critical slippage in the discourse 
of Molecular Genetics. For example, is a genome 
the full complement of an organism’s genes or of its 
DNA? Is Genetics the study of genes or the study 
of heredity? Is the genetic code the mechanism for 
translating nucleotide sequence to amino acid sequence 
or to phenotype? Does the central dogma refer to the 
information in proteins or in phenotype? Similarly, 
does «genetic information» refer to the sequences 
coding for proteins or to all DNA sequences?
Each of these questions stems from a collapse of 
meanings, from an elision between one, concrete, 
meaning, and another open-ended and ambiguous. 
Such elision invites the illusion that the ambiguity 
of the open-ended term has been resolved, and by 
implication, that the gap between actual achievement 
and promise has been closed. The fact remains however 
that, despite the phenomenal progress molecular 
biology has made, we remain to this day without an 
adequate account of the organization of proteins into 
an organism. 
Two points seem worth noting. First is that these 
elisions are not casual but systematic. Second is 
their simultaneous transparency and opacity. Once 
identified, they seem crystal clear, plain for anyone to 
see; recognition depends neither on special expertise, 
nor on new findings. Yet this style or habit of chronic 
slippage from one set of meanings 
to the other has prevailed for 
over fifty years; it has become 
so deeply ensconced as to have 
become effectively invisible 
to most readers of biological 
literature. 
For me, the questions of 
primary interest are: how have 
these elisions affected the research 
trajectory of molecular biology 
and what makes it possible now 
for Ball to write that «the conventional narrative 
[...] is as misleading as the popular narrative of gene 
function itself»? To address these questions, I focus 
on the tacit equation that underlies the very definition 
of genetics, namely, the equation of the totality of an 
organism’s genes with its genomes, its chromosomes, 
and its genetics – an equation, inherited directly from 
the earlier language of classical genetics, that has been 
a staple of the discourse of molecular biology since its 
beginning. 
n GENES,	GENOMES,	AND	JUNK	DNA2
In the early days of genetics, there would have been no 
obvious reason to question the understanding of the 
study of genetics as the study of genes, and indeed, the 
frequent elision between genes and mutations in that 
literature suggests the expectation that there was no 
other chromosomal locus in which heritable mutations 
could arise. But from the 1970s on, especially as the 
focus of molecular genetics shifted to the study of 
2 For a more complete account of this history, see Keller (2014).
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eukaryotic organisms, and as the study of regulation 
assumed increasing centrality to that science, the 
relation between genes and genetics has become far 
less straightforward. To the extent that regulation is a 
property of DNA, it is surely genetic, but is it always 
attributable to genes? Clearly, the answer depends on 
what is meant by the word gene, but taking the word 
in its most commonly invoked sense, the question 
becomes: is regulation always attributable to protein-
coding sequences?
A related challenge to the equivalence between 
genes and genetic material came from a series of 
discoveries of substantial expanses of nonprotein-
coding («non-genic» or «extra») DNA sequences in 
eukaryotic genomes. Of particular importance were 
the discoveries of (1) large amounts of repetitive 
DNA, and later, of transposable elements; (2) the 
wildly varying relationship between the amount of 
DNA in an organism and its complexity; and (3) split 
genes (protein-coding sequences interrupted by non-
coding «introns»). However, the challenge was soon 
blunted by the designation of such DNA as «junk» 
(Ohno, 1972). After 1980, with the appearance of two 
extremely influential papers published back-to-back 
in Nature (Doolittle & Sapienza, 1980; Orgel & Crick, 
1980), the idea of «junk DNA» seemed to become 
entrenched. 
Borrowing Richard Dawkins’ notion of selfish 
DNA, Orgel and Crick were explicit about their use of 
that term:
[…] in a wider sense, so that it can refer not only to 
obviously repetitive DNA but also to certain other 
DNA sequences which appear to have little or no 
function, such as much of the DNA in the introns of 
genes and parts of the DNA sequences between genes 
[...] The conviction has been growing that much of this 
extra DNA is «junk», in other words, that it has little 
specificity and conveys little or no selective advantage to 
the organism... 
(Orgel & Crick, 1980, p. 604)
Until the early 1990s, the assumption that 
the large amounts of non-coding DNA found in 
eukaryotic organisms had «little or no function», that 
it contributed nothing to their phenotype and could 
therefore be ignored, remained relatively uncontested. 
For all practical purposes, genomes (or at least the 
interesting parts of genomes) could still be thought 
of as collections of genes. Indeed, when the Human 
Genome Project (HGP) first announced its intention 
to sequence the entire human genome, much of the 
opposition to that proposal was premised on this 
assumption. Thus, e.g., Bernard Davis complained 
that: 
[…] blind sequencing of the genome can also lead to 
the discovery of new genes […] but this would not be 
an efficient process. On average, it would be necessary 
to plow through 1 to 2 million «junk» bases before 
encountering an interesting sequence. 
(Davis, 1990, p. 343)
And in a similar vein, Robert Weinberg argued: 
The sticky issue arises at the next stage of the project, its 
second goal, which will involve determining the entire 
DNA sequence of our own genome and those of several 
others. Here one might indeed raise questions, as it is 
not obvious how useful most of this information will be 
to anyone. This issue arises because upwards of 95 % of 
our genome contains sequence blocks that seem to carry 
little if any biological information. [...] In large part, this 
vast genetic desert holds little promise of yielding many 
gems. 
(Weinberg, 1991, p. 78)
Weinberg’s assumptions were widely shared in 
the molecular biology community, and inevitably, 
they had consequences. Take, for example, work 




















commonplace for medical geneticists to regard 
the significance of mutations in non-coding DNA 
exclusively in terms of their value in identifying the 
main actors of interest, i.e., the genes responsible for 
disease. Thus, for example, official descriptions of the 
goal of the International HapMap Project (launched 
in 2003) systematically confound «DNA sequence 
variation» (wherever it occurs) with disease «genes», 
promising «to develop a public resource that will help 
researchers find genes that are associated with human 
health and disease» (The International HapMap 
Consortium, 2004, p. 468).
A similar story can also be told about the neglect 
of non-coding (or non-genic) DNA in molecular 
evolution. For reasons partly technical and partly 
conceptual, work of molecular 
evolutionary biologists has 
traditionally focused on changes 
in the protein coding sequences 
of DNA, with conclusions based 
on the assumption that such 
sequences can be taken as a 
stand in for the entire genome. 
But such stories of neglect – in 
medical genetics, of the medical 
implications of non-genic 
DNA, in evolutionary biology – can be told now only 
because the assumptions on which they were based 
have now begun to be noticed, and accordingly, to be 
challenged. So what happened that made this possible 
(that made Ball’s article possible)?
The launching of the HGP in 1990 may well have 
been the most significant moment in the history of 
our understanding of the relations between genes 
and genomes. With the rise of genomics our view of 
the genome as simply a collection of genes has all 
but collapsed. Of particular shock value were the 
discoveries of how few genes the human genome 
contained, and of how small a portion of the genome’s 
structure is devoted to protein coding sequences. In 
a review article published in 2004, John Mattick 
displayed the ratio of non-
coding to total genomic DNA 
as an increasing function of 
developmental complexity, 
estimating that ratio as 98.5 % for 
humans. The obvious question is, 
what is all that non-coding DNA 
for? Can it possibly all be junk?
The notion of junk DNA 
handily accommodates the 
classical view of genomes as 
collections of genes. But the rise 
of genomic data has brought that accommodation to 
a breaking point. In 2003, a new metaphor came into 
use, one that has by now largely replaced the older 
one (Gibbs, 2003). Instead of «junk», non-genic DNA 
has become «the dark matter of the genome».
This was also the year in which the research 
consortium ENCODE (Encyclopedia Of DNA 
Elements) was formed, charged with the task 
of identifying all the functional elements in the 
human genome. Early results were reported in 
Nature in 2007, and they effectively put the kibosh 
on the hypothesis that non-coding DNA lacked 
organismic function. They confirmed that the 
human genome is «pervasively transcribed» even 
where non-coding; that the resulting transcripts are 
involved in forms and levels of genetic regulation 
heretofore unsuspected; that regulatory sequences 
of the resulting ncRNA may overlap protein coding 
sequences, or that they may be far removed from 
coding sequences; and that non-coding sequences are 
often strongly conserved under evolution.
The take-home message is clear. Genetics is not 
just about genes and what they code for. It is also 
about how the DNA sequences that give rise to 
proteins are transcribed, spliced, and translated into 
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the appropriate time and place; about how these, once 
assembled into proteins, navigate or are transported 
to the sites where, and when, they are needed, etc. All 
of this requires coordination of an order of complexity 
only now beginning to be appreciated. NcRNA 
transcripts of the remaining 98-99 % of the genome 
turn out to be crucial to the regulation of transcription, 
alternative splicing, chromosome dynamics, epigenetic 
memory, and more. They are even implicated in the 
editing of other RNA transcripts, and of modulating 
the configuration of the regulatory networks these 
transcripts form. In short, they provide the means by 
which gene expression can respond to both immediate 
and longer range environmental context and adapt 
appropriately. 
Adaptation does not require direct alteration of 
DNA sequences: environmental signals trigger a wide 
range of signal transduction cascades that routinely 
lead to short-term adaptation. Moreover, by lending to 
such adaptations the possibility of intergenerational 
transmission, epigenetic memory works to extend short-
term to long-term adaptation. As Mattick explains:
The ability to edit RNA […] suggests that not only 
proteins but also – and perhaps more importantly – 
regulatory sequences can be modulated in response to 
external signals and that this information may feed back 
via RNA-directed chromatin modifications into epigenetic 
memory.
(Mattick, 2010, p. 551)
Finally, environmental signals are not restricted to 
the simple physical and chemical molecular biology 
stimuli that directly impinge: organisms with central 
nervous systems have receptors for forms of perception 
that are both more complex and longer range. Humans 
have especially sophisticated perceptual capacities, 
enabling them to respond to a wide range of complex 
visual, auditory, linguistic, and behavioral/emotional 
signals in their extended environment. Recent 
research has begun to show that responses to such 
fundamentally social signals also extend way down to 
the level of gene expression.
n CONCLUSION:	WHY	IT	MATTERS
The gap between a collection of protein-coding 
sequences and the full complement of genetic 
material (or DNA) of an organism is as important as 
it is large. There is of course debate about just how 
important: in particular, ENCODE’s attribution of 
functionality to virtually all transcribed sequences 
has been hotly disputed. But scarcely anyone today 
would claim that non-coding DNA is without function. 
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what kinds of function can be tied to ncDNA, 
and about the implications of such attribution. A 
relatively conservative response is simply to 
rename all transcribed sequences of the DNA as 
genes, attempting thereby to hold onto the view of 
these entities (and hence of genomes) as effectively 
autonomous formal agents, containing within 
themselves the blueprint for an organism’s life – i.e., 
all of the biological information needed to build a 
living organism. 
But current research demands a more radical 
reformulation and, in good part, that it does so by 
focusing attention on features that have been missing 
from our conceptual framework. 
In addition to providing 
information required for building 
an organism, the genome also 
provides a vast amount of 
information enabling it to adapt 
and respond to the environment 
in which it finds itself. 
Fortunately so, for without such 
capacity, how could organisms 
develop and maintain themselves 
in the face of environmental 
vicissitudes? 
Rather than a set of genes 
initiating causal chains leading 
to the formation of traits, 
today’s genome might better be 
described as an exquisitely sensitive reactive system 
– a device for regulating the production of specific
proteins in response to the constantly changing
signals it receives from its environment. The signals it
detects come most immediately from its intra-cellular
environment, but these, in turn, reflect input from the
external environments of the cell and of the organism.
Humans are especially reactive systems, and they
are so on every level at which they are capable of
interacting: cultural, interpersonal, cellular, and even
genetic. We have long understood that organisms
interact with their environments; that interactions
between genetics and environment, between biology
and culture, are crucial to making us what we are.
What research in genomics seems to show is that,
at every level, biology itself is constituted by those
interactions – even at the level of genetics. If much of
what the genome «does» is to respond to signals from
its environment, then the bifurcation of developmental
influences into the categories of genetic and
environmental makes no sense.
Such a reformulation does, however, leave us with
an obvious question: if the genome is so responsive
to its environment, how is it that the developmental 
process is as reliable as it is? This is a question 
of major importance in biology, and it is rapidly 
becoming evident that the answer must be sought 
not only in the structural (sequence) stability of the 
genome, but also in both the relative constancy of 
environmental inputs and the dynamic stability of 
the system as a whole (Keller, 2000). Genomes are 
responsive, but far from infinitely so; the range of 
possible responses is severely constrained, both by the 
organizational dynamics of the system in which they 
are embedded and by their own structure. 
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«IF MUCH OF WHAT THE 
GENOME “DOES” IS TO 
RESPOND TO SIGNALS 
FROM ITS ENVIRONMENT, 
THEN THE BIFURCATION 
OF DEVELOPMENTAL 
INFLUENCES INTO THE 
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AND ENVIRONMENTAL MAKES 
NO SENSE»
